Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1967

Trade Commission of Utah, State of Utah v. Skaggs
Drug Centers, Inc., Grand Central Stores, Inc., D/
B/A Warshaw's Giant Food and Grand Central
Drugs, Inc. : Brief of Appellant

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Phil L. Hansen and Floyd G. Astin; Attorneys for Appellant
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah Trade Comm'n v. Skaggs Drug, No. 11034 (1967).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3311

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

TRADE COMMISSION OF UTAH,
STATE OF UTAH,

·~.. SKAGGS :ORUG OBNTER8, INC., · "'· . , "~.,.1~

: ~ .Qtu.ND CENTRAL STOKBS INC· > (:· - ••.,
: fl/lt/a 'WA'RIHAW'S GIANT iOoo~ . '?}~
•. . - GRAND 08MTRAL DRVUll~"~
~-Riii•

BRIEF OF - ...
Appal . . . tlm - - Tlaird DiRriet Court of ldt .Honeable . . . . . ..... -

.JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK 6

IJt: _

=ft ·,, t.t·

800 Walker Bank Building

"' \

' ;.

.i~

':·l•-

Salt Lake City, Utah
MULLINER, PRINCE 6 MAN
., . , \ .· ·'""',
908 El Paso Natural Gas B ·
· . ', '~,
Balt Lake City, Utah
0[C2-tl
Attorneys for Respondents
·
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRIST£NS8"("~--701 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Intervenor

I

lNDEX

f'age

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT _

1

I

1

_____ _________________ _

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS ______ _

2

ARGUMENTS _______ -------------------- ------ ----------------- _-------------

6

POINT I

6

THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE ACT IN ITS
ENTIRETY AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, VOID AND UNENFORCEABLE AND IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND IN VIOLATION OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 1, 2, 7, 18, 23
AND 24, ARTICLE VI, SECTION 36, AND ARTICLE
XXII, SECTION 20, IN THE FOLLOWING RESPECTS:
(A) THE STATUTORY PRESUMPTION THAT IN
THE ABSENCE OF PROOF OF A LESSER COST, THE
COST AS DEFINED IN THE ACT MEANS SIX PERCENT (6%) ABOVE INVOICE OR REPLACEMENT
COST, LESS TRADE DISCOUNTS, EXCEPT CASH DISCOUNTS, PLUS FREIGHT CHARGES (OR 6% PERCENT THAT THE RETAILER PAYS FOR CARTAGE)
IS AN ARBITRARY, UNREASONABLE AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD IN THAT IT APPLIES
THAT SAME STANDARD TO ALL GOODS AND TO
ALL MERCHANDISE WITHOUT REGARD TO DIFFERING PRICE AND COST FACTORS INHERENT IN RETAIL MERCHANDISING AS WELL AS DIFFERENT
PRICE AND COST FACTORS PERTAINING TO THE
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INDIVIDUAL RETAILER. ALSO, IT IS PRICE FIXING
IN THAT IT IS NOT A REAL ALTERNATIVE. (R. 43,
Conclusions of Law, a, c, d, and e)
(B) THE DEFINITION OF THE TERM "REPLACEMENT COST" IN THE ACT IS VAGUE, AMBIGUOUS
AND UNENFORCEABLE AND PLACES AN UNREASONABLE BURDEN ON THE RETAIL MERCHANT IN
DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT HIS PRICE FOR
A PARTICULAR ITEM OF MERCHANDISE IS OR IS
NOT IN VIOLATION OF THE ACT. (R. 44, Conclusions
of Law, f)
(C) THE ACT IS ARBITRARY, UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND UNREASONABLE IN PROHIBITING A SALE
BELOW COST AS DEFINED IN THE ACT WHERE THE
ONLY INTENT OF THE RETAILER IN PRICING THE
ITEMS BELOW COST IS TO INDUCE CUSTOMERS
OF THE RETAILER TO PURCHASE OTHER MERCHANDISE OF THAT RETAILER, AND IS VAGUE AND
AMBIGUOUS IN DEFINING THE PROHIBITED INTENT OF UNFAIRLY DIVERTING TRADE FROM A
COMPETITOR OR INJURING A COMPETITOR. (R. 44,
45, Conclusions of Law, g, h)
(D) THE STATUTORY PRESUMPTION OF PERCENTAGE MARKUP PRESENT IN THE ACT WITH
ITS CRIMINAL SANCTIONS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
SHIFTS THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO DEFENDANTS.
(R. 43, 44, Conclusions of Law, b, i)
(E) THE TERM "LEGAL PRICE OF A COMPETITOR"
AS USED IN SECTION 13-5-12 ( d) IS UNCONSTITOTION ALLY VAGUE, AMBIGUOUS, AND UNENFORCEABLE IF CONSTRUED AS REQUIRING A RET.\ILEH
TO DETERMINE AT HIS PERIL WHETHER A COMPETITOR IN ADVERTISING OR SELLING A PARTIC-
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Page

ULAR ITEM IS NOT A SALE BELOW COST AS DEFINED IN THE ACT WITH THE INTENT PROHIBITED BY THE ACT. (R. 45, Conclusions of Law, k)
(F) HE PRESUMPTION SET FORTH IN SECTION
13-5-9 (2) PRESENT IN THE ACT, WITH ITS CRIMINAL SANCTIONS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY SHIFTS
THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO THE DEFENDANTS
AND ARBITRARILY ASSUMES A PROHIBITED INTENT WITH A FACT UNRELATED TO THE STATE
OF MIND OF THE DEFENDANT. (R. 45, Conclusions of
Law, I)
POINT II _______________ _ -- ---------------------- -----------------------------------

23

WITH RESPECT TO GRAND CENTRAL'S SALE OF
AQUA NET HAIR SPRAY AT FORTY NINE CENTS
AND SKAGG'S SALE OF STYLE HAIR SPRAY AT
FORTY NINE CENTS ON JUNE 23rd, 1966, THE
COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THEY WERE EACH
MADE BY THEM IN AN ENDEAVOR TN GOOD FAITH
TO MEET THE PRICES OF THEIR COMPETITOR,
SHOPPERS DISCOUNT, AND IN HOLDING THAT
THEY WERE ENTITLED TO ASSUME THAT THE ADVERTISED PRICE OF SHOPPERS DISCOUNT FOR
AQUA NET HAIR SPRAY WAS A LEGAL PRICE IN THE
ABSENCE OF ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF AN ILLEGAL
SALE BY SHOPPERS DISCOUNT IN VIOLATION OF
THE ACT. (R. 46(a).)
POINT III ___ _________________________________ ---------------------- - 24
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SALE
BY SKAGGS OF CIGARETTES AND THE GIFT OF A
CIGARETTE LIGHTER WITH A CARTON OF CIGARETTES DID NOT VIOLATE THE ACT BECAUSE THE
SALE OF THE CIGARETTES ALONE WAS NOT A SALE

INDEX-( Contmued1

BELOW COST AS DEFINED IN THE ACT AND THE
GIFT OF THE CIGARETTE LIGHTER WAS A GIFT,
NOT A SALE, AND NOT PROHIBITED BY SECTION
13-5-9 OF THE ACT. (R. 46. b)
POINT IV .................................................................... 25
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO INTRODUCE SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE THAT THE INTENT OF SKAGGS AND/OR
GRAND CENTRAL IN MAKING THE SALE OF ASPIRINS, SWINGER CAMERA, LEE'S MEN'S PANTS, AND
TURKEYS, WAS TO INDUCE THE PURCHASE OF
OTHER MERCHANDISE OR TO UNLAWFULLY DIVERT TRADE FROM A COMPETITOR OR TO OTHERWISE INJURE A COMPETITOR. (R. 413, 47, 48)
27

CONCLUSION ...
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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
TRADE COMMISSION OF UT AH,
ST ATE OF UTAH,

l

Plaintiff - Appellant,
- vs -

SKAGGS DRUG CENTERS, INC.,
GRAND CENTRAL STORES, INC.,
d/b/a WARSHAW'S GIANT FOOD
and GRAND CENTRAL DRUGS,INC.,

11034
Case No.

Defendants - Respondents.
and UTAH RETAIL GROCERS'

ASSOCIATION

Intervenor - Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This case involves a complaint by the plaintiff,
the Trade Commission cf Utah, herein referred to as
the "Trade Cornission," against the defendantE',
Skaggs Drug Center, Inc., herein referred to as
"Skaggs," Grand Central Stores, Inc., d/b/a Warshaw's Giant Food c:md Grand Central Drugs, Inc.,
herein referred to as "Grand Central," charging e_
.riolation of the Utah State Unfair Practices Act here-

2
in referred to as the "Act" unless more specific sections are clted.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
A complaint wa2 filed in the District Court of Salt
Lake County on the 16th day of Septeber, 1966, by
the Trade Commission charging Skaggs on six '
counts and Grand Central on five counts of violating the Utah State Unfair Practices Act. On the 22nd
day of December, 1966, pursuant to a motion, the
Utah Retail Grocer's Associatoin was permitted to
intervene as a party plaintiff. The matter came on
for hearing on the 16th day of May, 1967, before the
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, sitting without a jury,
at Salt Lake City, Utah. After having entered its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the court
entered judgment on the 13th day of September,
1967, in favor of the defendants and against the
plaintiff and intervenor on each count of plaintiff's
complaint.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant respectfully submits that the judc;ment of the lower court be reversed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the 23rd day of June, 1966, Skaggs and
Grand Central each advertized Crest Family Toothpaste at fifty cents. which is below cost as defined in
the Act, with intent and puroose of inducing the

3
purchase of other merchandise or of unfairly diverting trade from a competitor or otherwise injuring a
competitor. (R. 37)
On or about June 16th, 1966, Shoppers' Discount
Store, Inc., herein referred to as "Shoppers Discount," advertised and sold Aqua Net Hair Spray at
forty-nine cents, which was a sale below cost as defined in the Act. On June 23rd, 1966, Grand Central
advertised Aqua Net Hair Spray, and Skaggs advertised Style Hair Spray, a comparable product, for
sale at forty-nine cents, each of which was a sale below cost as defined in the Act. The sale by Grand
Central and Skaggs was an endeavor to meet the
price of Shoppers Discount, all of which are competitors. Neither of said defendants at any time had
any actual knowledge that the Shoppers Discount
price on such item was a sale below cost, as defined by the Act. The Trade Commission, to the
knowledge of Skaggs or Grand Central, had not
taken any action against Shoppers Discount to enforce the provisions of the Act with respect to its sale
of AqUa Net Hair Spray for forty-nine cents. However, Skaggs and Grand Central made no effort to
determine if the price of the competitor's item was
below cost or not. (T. 62, 43) Aqua Net Hair Spray is
a product with wide wholesale price fluxuations
which can be purchased by retailers, including
Skaggs, Grand Central, and Shoppers Discount, in
numerous ways from many different suppliers. (R.
37, 38)
On or about June 20th, 1966, Skaggs advertised
cartons of cigarettes for $2.73, and gave a cigarette
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lighter free with each purchase of a carton, which
cigarette lighter cost Skaggs twenty-five cents each.
The sale of the carton of cigarettes alone was not a
sale below cost as defined in the Act, but the combined sales, cigarettes and lighter if taken together
and considered a single item, was a sale below cost
as defined in the Act. (R. 39)
On June 16th, 1966, Skaggs advertised in the
Provo Daily Herald in Provo, Utah, the sale of Vimanal Vitamins at eighty-three cents per one hundred
tablets, which sale was a sale below cost as defined
in the Act. In the Provo, Utah trade area, Vimanal
Vitamins are offered for sale and sold exclusively
by Skaggs, thus Skaggs has no competitors with
respect to said item. (R. 39, 40)
On June 23rd, 1966, Skaggs and Grand Central
each offered Bayer Aspirin (lOOcm) at fifty-five cents
per one hundred. Bayer Aspirin is supplied and delivered direc1ly to the defendants retail outlets by
the supplier without cartage cost to the defendants.
Bayer Aspirin is a product in constant demand by
customers of defendants with a high turnover and
with little labor, waste, spoilage, or advertising cost
to defendants. The sale of Bayer Aspirin at fifty-five
cents by Grand Central was not a sale below cost
as defined in the Act, but the sale of the same item
at the same price was a sale below cost as defined in
the Act. (R. 40)
On or about June 20th, 1966, Skaggs advertised
for sale at $13.49 Polaroid Swinger Cameras, limited
to one per customer, which was less than the entire
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supply owned or possessed by Skaggs. The p:i:"ice
at which said item was sold was a sale below cost as
defined in the Act. The court found that but for the
presumption set forth in Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.
§ 13-5-5(2) (1962), that Skaggs, by such sale, intended
to injure competitors or destroy competition, there
was insufficient evidence introduced by plaintiff's
to justify a finding by this court that Skaggs offered
said items for sale with the intent and purpose of inducing the purchase of other merchandise or of unfairly diverting trade from a competitor or otherwise injuring a competitor. (R. 40)
On June 16th, 1966, Grand Central advertised
Lee's Men's Pants at two pairs for $5.00, which was a
sale below cost as defined in the Act. The court
found that the sale by Grand Central was not with
the intent to induce purchase of other merchandise,
to unfairly divert trade from a competitor, or to otherwise injure a competitor, but was done with the sole
intent and purpose of reducing what Grand Central
in good faith believed was an excessive inventory
in their store at the time of Lee's Men's Pants. (R. 41)
On November 8th, 1965, Grand Central purchased frozen tom turkeys at thirty-three and one
half cents a pound. Thereafter, on December 17th,
1965, more than thirty days after the original purchase, additional frozen tom turkeys were purchased at an invoice cost of thirty-seven and one
half cents per pound. On December 17th, 1965, and
thereafter, Grand Central had in stock co-mingled
frozen tom turkeys purchased on November 8th,
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1965, at thirty-three and one half cents per pound
and frozen tom turkeys purchased on December
17th, 1965, at thirty-seven and one half cents per
pound. The co-mingled turkeys were subsequently
sold by Grand Central on and after December 17th,
1965, for thirty-seven cents per pound, which was a
sale below cost as defined in the Act in that the
turkeys purchased November 8th, 1965, were sold
more than thirty days from the date of such purchase
and the replacement cost of the same at that time
was thirty-seven and one half cents per pound, and
the turkeys purchased on December 17th, 1965,
were sold at thirty-seven cents which was a sale below cost as defined in the Act. The sales by Grand
Central on or prior to December 8th, 1965, of the
turkeys purchased on November 8th, 1965, were not
sales below cost as defined in the Act.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE ACT IN ITS
ENTIRETY AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, VOID AND UNENFORCEABLE AND IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND IN VIOLATION OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 1, 2, 7, 18, 23
AND 24, ARTICLE VI, SECTION 36, AND ARTICLE
XXII, SECTION 20, IN THE FOLLOWING RESPECTS:
(A) THE STATUTORY PRESUMPTION THAT IN
THE ABSENCE OF PROOF OF A LESSER COST, THE
COST AS DEFINED IN THE ACT MEANS SIX PERCENT (6%) ABOVE INVOICE OR REPLACEMENT
COST, LESS TRADE DISCOUNTS, EXCEPT CASH DIS-

COUNTS, PLUS FREIGHT CHARGES (OR 6 314 PERCENT THAT THE RETAILER PAYS FOR CARTAGE)
IS AN ARBITRARY, UNREASONABLE AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD IN THAT IT APPLIES
THAT SAME STANDARD TO ALL GOODS AND TO
ALL MERCHANDISE WITHOUT REGARD TO DIFFERING PRICE AND COST FACTORS INHERENT IN RETAIL MERCHANDISING AS WELL AS DIFFERENT
PRICE AND COST FACTORS PERTAINING TO THE
INDIVIDUAL RETAILER. ALSO, IT IS PRICE FIXING
IN THAT IT IS NOT A REAL ALTERNATIVE. (R. 43,
Conclusions of Law, a, c, d, and e)
(B) THE DEFINITION OF THE TERM "REPLACEMENT COST" IN THE ACT IS VAGUE, AMBIGUOUS
AND UNENFORCEABLE AND PLACES AN UNREASONABLE BURDEN ON THE RETAIL MERCHANT IN
DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT HIS PRICE FOR
A PARTICULAR ITEM OF MERCHANDISE IS OR IS
NOT IN VIOLATION OF THE ACT. (R. 44, Conclusions
of Law, f)
(C) THE ACT IS ARBITRARY, UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND UNREASONABLE IN PROHIBITING A SALE
BELOW COST AS DEFINED IN THE ACT WHERE THE
ONLY INTENT OF THE RETAILER IN PRICING THE
ITEMS BELOW COST IS TO INDUCE CUSTOMERS
OF THE RETAILER TO PURCHASE OTHER MERCHANDISE OF THAT RETAILER, AND IS VAGUE AND
AMBIGUOUS IN DEFINING THE PROHIBITED INTENT OF UNFAIRLY DIVERTING TRADE FROM A
COMPETITOR OR INJURING A COMPETITOR. (R. 44,
45, Conclusions of Law, g, h)
(D) THE STATUTORY PRESUMPTION OF PERCENTAGE MARKUP PRESENT IN THE ACT WITH
ITS CRIMINAL SANCTIONS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY

SHIFTS THE -BURDEN. OF PROOF TO DEFENDANTS.
(R. 43, 44, Conclusions of Law, b, i)
(E) .THE TERM "LEGAL PRICE OF A COMPETITOR"
AS USED IN SECTION 13-5-12 (d) IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE, AMBIGUOUS, AND UNENFORCEABLE IF CONSTRUED AS REQUIRING A RETAILER
TO DETERMINE AT HIS PERIL WHETHER A COMPETITOR IN ADVERTISING OR SELLING A PARTICULAR ITEM IS NOT A SALE BELOW COST AS DEFINED IN THE ACT WITH THE INTENT PROHIBITED BY THE ACT. (R. 45, Conclusions of Law, k)
(F)

HE PRESUMPTION SET FORTH IN SECTION

13-5-9 (2) PRESENT IN THE ACT, WITH ITS CRIM-

INAL SANCTIONS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY SHIFTS
THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO THE DEFENDANTS
AND ARBITRARILY ASSUMES A PROHIBITED INTENT WITH A FACT UNRELATED TO THE STATE
OF MIND OF THE DEFENDANT. (R. 45, Conclusions of
Law, I)

Nearly all states of the Union have some form
of legislation governing unfair business practices
with the majority of them having some provision
prohibiting sales below cost. There have been a
number of reasons given for the need of such legislation.
The United States Supreme Court in Safeway
v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Ass'n, 360 U.S. 334 (1959)
stated:
... ~ne of the chief aims of state laws prohibiting
sales below cost to put an end to "loss-leader"
selling. The selling of selected goods at a loss in

order to lure customers into the store is deemed not
only a destructive means of competition; it also
plays on the gullibility of customers by leading
them to expect what generally is not true, namely,
that a store which offers such an amazing bargain
is full of other such bargains. Clearly there is a
reasonable basis for a conclusion that selective
price cuts tend to perpetrate this abuse ... (Emphasis added.)

The Utah State Supreme Court gave another
reason in Burt v. Woolsulate. 146 P.2d 203 (1944) in
which it stated:
... As a part of the same movement resort was had
to the Unfair Practices Acts. These latter statutes
could not standardize prices as Fair Trade Acts
had done, but they did aim at alleviating the hardships of "cut-throat," competition.
. . . One of the practices aimed at by these statutes
is that, common with chain stores, of selling at
lower prices in one locality than in another and
making up losses incurred by profits in other
stores .... (Emphasis added.)

This latter approach of selling at different prices
at different stores was admitted in testimony given
on behalf of Skaggs Drugs and Grand Central (T.
48, 49, 122) Of course, the eventual effect of this
"cut-throat" competittion is to drive the smaller merchant out of business and leave fewer and fewer
companies to compete until they eventually dominate the market and destroy competition.

l ll

In Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram
Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 57 S. Ct. 139, 81 L.EJ
109 (1936), the court said:
There is a great body of fact and opinion tending
to show that price cutting by retail dealers is not
only injurious to the good will and business of the
producer and distributor of identified goods, The
evidence to that effect is voluminous; * * *.

The majority of the courts have upheld the constitutionality of laws which prohibit sales below cost
and have said that they are not violative of the due
process and equal protection clauses of the federal,
and our respective state constitutions. They have
held that it is within the police power of the state
and the legislature is vested with wide discretions in
determining whatever economic policy may be
deemed to promote the public welfare and the
courts are not able to override the policy so long as
the laws bear a reasonable relationship to the legislative purpose and are neither arbitrary and discriminatory nor vague and ambiguous. See Avella v.
Almac's, 211A.2d665 (R.I. 1965); Guine v. Civil Serv·
ice Comm'n, 141 S.E.2d 364 (W.V. 1965); Bordon v.
Thompson, 353 S.W.2d 735 (Mo. 1962); Rocky Moun·
lain Wholesale Co. v. Ponca Wholesale Mercantile
Co., 68 N.M. 228, 360 P.2d 643 (1961); Simonetti, Inc.
v. State ex rel. Gallion, 272 Ala. 398, 132 So.2d 252
(1961); State v. Consumer Warehouse Market, 183
Kan. 502, 329 P.2d 638 (1958). Other decisions are collected and analyzed in 128 A.LR. 1126 and 118
A.LR. 506.

The Supreme Court of the United States m Nebbia v. People of State of New York, 291 U.S. 502, 54
S.Ct. 505, 78 L.Ed. 940 (1933), stated:
So far as the requirements of due process is concerned, and in the absence of other constitutional
restriction, a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote
public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legisslation adapted to i.ts purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such policy, or, when
it is declared by the legislature, to override it. If
the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements
of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio. 'Whether the free operation of the normal laws
of competition is a wise and wholesome rule for
trade and commerce is an economic question which
this court need not consider or determine.' Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197,
337, 338, 24 S. Ct. 436, 457, 48 L.Ed. 679. And it is
equally clear that if the legislative policy be to curb
unrestrained and harmful competition by measures
which are not arbitrary or discriminatory it does
not lie with the courts to determine that the rule
is unwise. With the wisdom of the policy adopted,
with the adequacy or practicability of the law enacted to forward it, the courts are both incompetent
and unauthorized to deal. The course of decision
in this court exhibits a firm adherence to these
principles. Times without number we have said
that the Legislature is primarily the judge of the
necessity of such an enactment, that every possible
presumption is in favor of its validity, and that
though the court may hold views inconsistent with

the wisdom of the law, it may not be annulled unless palpably in excess of legislative power.
. . . The Constitution does not secure to any one
liberty to conduct his business in such fashion as to
inflict injury upon the public at large, or upon any
substantial group of people ....

(A)

The Act is not too vague in that it is impossible to show a lesser cost than that of the presumed
6% cost because of the problem of accurately allocating all of the variable accounting costs to any
single item. The lesser cost mnst be a "markup to
cover a proportionate part of the cost of doing business.''
This was the principle point of issue in the case
of Flank Oil Co. v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., '
349 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1960), and the court after reviewing the various cases concluded that the
phrase "cost of doing business" was not too vague
and quoted from State v. Langley, 84 P.2d 767 (Wyo.
1938):
Hence, in the absence of provisions to the contrary,
we must presume that the legislature did not intend
to prescribe that the cost must be absolutely exact,
and that it must be based upon the precise method
of accounting which any one merchant might adopt,
but meant, by "cost," what businessmen generally
mean, namely the approximate cost arrived at by
a reasonable rule. Hence, if a particular method
adopted by a merchant cannot, under the facts dis-

closed, be said to be unreasonable, and does not
disclose an intentional evasion of the law, and the
method so adopted should be accepted as correct. In
other words, all that man is required to do under
this statute is to act in good faith ... The standard
set by the legislature is virtually reduced to one of
reasonableness. And it is held that "reasonableness" as "a standard of an act, which can determine
objectively from circumstances, is a common, widely-used, and constitutionally valid standard in law."

The court went on to say:
The fact that the act is difficult to administer does
not justify a ruling of invalidity and it would appear that the defendants "complexity" argument
finally reduces itself to this. In People v. Payless
Drug Store, supra, the court commented ... "Any
difficulty in computing cost is a factual one, and
statutes are not to be declared invalid because in
their application factual difficulties may arise."
(25 Cal.2d 108, 153 P.2d 15). In Hale v. Kusy,
supra, the Nebraska court said: ... "Mere difficulty
of application in the process of litigation is not
enough to enable a court to say that a statute is
unconstitutional" ( 150 Neb. 643, 35 N.W.2d 597).

In regards to applying the six percent figure to
differing price and cost factors of various types of
merchandise, the court in State v. Consumers Warehouse, supra, stated:
Another contention advanced by appellee is that
the Act is arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory because, in defining costs, G.S. 1949, 50-401
(a) and (b) sets a standard markup of six-percent

for retailers and two percent for wholesalers as the
cost of doing business, in the absence of proof of
lesser costs. The principal argument made on this
point is that there are many lines or merchandise
which are normally sold at a greater markup than
the standards specified, hence the Act affords no
protection from unfair competition by sales below
actual cost in such lines of merchandise. Assuming
the truth of this argument, it is directed merely
against the wisdom of the legislature in selecting
the area of competition to be afforded the highest
degree of protection under the Act. We are unwilling to say that it was unreasonable or arbitrary
for that body to conclude that the greatest danger
to fair competition existed through price cutting
in the high turnover, low markup business, where a
slight margin separated profit from disaster, and
that such businesses, coming within the scope of its
terms, demostrates that it is not discriminatory.
Moreover, the legislature is not required to cover
all evils of like character in a single Act (State ex
rel. Mitchell v. Sage Stores Co., 157 Kan. at page
414, 141 P.2d at page 661, supra, and cases there
cited).

This is not a price fixing statute because there
is an adequate alternative if the reasonable standard is used p.s adopted in State v. Langley, supra.
Even jf it were price fixing this is not grounds
for declaring the Act unconstitutional. The Court in
Nebbia v. People of the State of New York. supra.
stated:
... But there can he no doubt upon proper occasion
and by appropriate measures the state may regulate a business in any aspects, including the pricPs

' "
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to be charged for the products or commodities it
sells .
. . . Price control, like any other form of regulation,
is unconstitutional only if arbitrary, discriminatory,
or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the Legislature is free to adopt, and hence an unnecessary
and unwarranted interference with individual liberty.

The court in Wholesale Tobacco Dealers Bureau
of Southern California, Inc. v. National Candy & Tobacco Co., 11 Cal.2d 634, 82 P.2d 3, at page 9 (1938),
reviewed this same charge of price fixing and found
a similar statute not to be so.
(B)

The court in Avella v. Almac's, 211 A.2d 665
(R.I. 1965), reviewed basically the same wording as
found in the Utah statute and found that portion of
the law here in question to be valid.
Here we do not have the problem of adding operating costs to each item. We are dealing only
with the invoice cost which is easily calculated. The
only possible problem might be some future rebate
determined by accumulative volume purchasing.
If this problem should arise, then the reasonableness
standards of State v. Langley, supra, should be used.
(C)

It is claimed to be unconstitutional in that there
is not a sufficient evil intent to create a criminal

statute. The example given is that "the intent and
purpose of inducing the purchase of other merchandise" is not evil in that no one is injured and thus
no evil. result need be accomplished to make the
seller guilty.
Utah Code Ann.
policy of the act:

~

13-5-17 (1962), sets forth the

The legislature declared that the purpose of this
act is to safeguard the public against the creation
or perpetuation of monopolies and to foster and
encourage competition, by prohibiting unfair and
discriminatory practice by which fair and honest
competition is destroyed or prevented. This act
shall be liberally construed that its beneficial purposes may be subserved.

Utah Code Ann.

~

13-5-7(a) (1962), provides:

It is hereby declared that any advertising, offer to
sell, or sale of any merchandise, either by retailers
or wholesalers, at less than cost as defined in this
act with the intent and purpose of inducing the
purchase of other merchandise or of unfairly diverting trade from a competitor or otherwise injuring
a competitor, impairs and prevents fair competition,
injures public welfare, is unfair competition contrary to public policy and the policy of this act
and is declared to be a violation of this act.

It is not the contents of the phrase, the "purpose
of inducing the purchase of other merchandise."
that the legislature has found to be evil. Rather, it is
the selling of merchandise below cost to induce the

purchase of other merchandise that is evil. The
courts have recognized this evil and have in effect
said, as does the statute, that it is "a desructive
means of competition" and "plays on the gullibility
of customers by leading them to expect what generally is not true," and is therefore "a reasonable
basis for a conclusion that selective price cuts tend
to perpetrate this abuse." See Safeway v. Oklahoma
Retail Grocer's Ass'n, supra. and Burt v. Woolsulate,
supra.
The court in Laundry Operating Co. v. Spalding
Laundry, 383 S.\l\T.2d 364 (Kan. 1964) stated:
We do not suggest that a purpose to divert or capture a competitor's business is wrong or unethical.
It is perfectly legitimate so long as it is not carried
out unfairly. The legislature simply has declared it
unfair to accomplish it through giving away goods
or services or selling them for less than cost.

The very nature of business is to acquire as
much business as economically possible from any
source. including any competitors. (T. 45, 4.6) Although the businessman may not have any evil
feelings toward his competitor, he is like the walrus
in "Through The Looking Glass" who shed copious
tears as he devoured the innocent oysters who accepted his invitation to stroll along the beach. He
meant them no harm of course. He merely wished
to to eat them.
It is fundamental logic that prolonged competition by selling itmes below cost will soon result in

only the most financially strong company remaining
and thus, competition is destroyed.

(D)
The criminal sanctions have not been made a.
part of this action and therefore should not be considered at this time. Avella v. Almac's. supra.
Even if it did apply, there is no shifting of the
burden of proof but rather the shifting of the burden
of going forward with the evidence, which is certainly not unconstitutional. 29 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence,
§ 123 to 127. This is especially true when we are
dealing with matters which are best known to the
party charged as we are in these types of cases.
(E)

Section l 3-5-l 2(d) exempts from the act the sales
made:
(d) In an endeavor made in good faith to meet
the legal prices of a competitor as herein defined
selling the same article, product, or commodity
in the some locality or trade area.

Under an identical provision found in the California law this point is discussed by the court in
People v. PayLess Drug Store, 153 P.2d 9 (Calif. 1944),
wherein the court stated:
The defendants contend that they should not be
compelled to ascertain "legal prices" of their competitors before invoking the exception provided by
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subdivision ( d) of section 6 for the reason that it is
impossible to ascertain the legal prices of competitors goods without an audit of their books. The
defendants have assumed an absolute prerequisite.
The requirement is not absolute. It is merely that
the defendants have endeavored "in good faith" to
meet the legal prices of a competitor. A similar provision was upheld in State v. Sears, 4 Wash.2d 200,
103 P.2d 337, 345, the court saying "That if a merchant in good faith reduces his prices to meet those
of a competitor, who he in good faith believes has a
legal price, he will not be violating either the intent
or the wording of the act." The provision therefore
is not like that involved in Commonwealth v. Zasloff, 338 Pa. 457, 13 A.2d 67, 128 A.L.R. 1120 (See,
also, State v. Packard-Hamburger and Co., 123
N.J.L. 180, 8 A.2d 291), holding invalid a provision
which exempted the merchant if the price was made
"to meet the legal price of a competitor as an absolute requirement without according him the opportunity of showing his good faith .... "

See Mcintire v. Borossky, 59 A.2d 471 (N.H.
1948).
This approach is consistent with the recent case
in the State of Washington of State v. Albertson. 412
P.2d 755 (1966), where the court refers to the "good
faith" belief that the defendant was meeting the
legal prices of a competitor. The court held that it
was not necessary for the defendant to look at the
books of a competitor to determine the legal price
but he must "in good faith" believe the price to be
legal. In that case the defendant had made an effort in good faith to determine if the price of his competitor was legal.
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(f)
A presumption of illegal intent has been struck
down in several cases from other jurisdictions. W. ,
M. Wiley v. Sampson-Ripley Co.. 120 A.2d 289 (1956);
Motts Supermarkets. Inc. v. Traasinelli. 148 Conn.
481, 172 A.2d 381 (196] ). In those cases, the mere fact
of a sale below cost created the presumption. However, even under these types of statutes, a number
of courts have found such a presumption valid.
In People v. PayLess Drug Stores. supra. the
court held that a presumption of unlawful intent may
be made from the mere fact of the sale below cost:
A statutory requirement that the defendant go forward with evidence to rebut a prima facie showing of
guilty intent from proof of specified facts is permissable when the result has some rational relation
to those facts and the defendant is given a fair opportunity to meet it by evidence. Morris v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 88, 54 S. Ct. 281, 284, 78 Law Ed.
664. That case designates as a test of permissibility
that "the state shall have proved enough to make
it just for the defendant to be required to repel
what has been proved with excuse or explanation,
or at least that upon a balancing of convenience or
of the opportunities or knowledge, the shifting of
the burden will be found to be an aid to the accuser
without subjecting the accused to hardship or oppression." Our statute does not withdraw from the
accuser the burden of providing a violation, nor
does it deprive the defendant of the benefit of presumption of innocence. Here there was a manifest
disparity in conveniences of proof and opportunity
for knowledge as between the plaintiff and the defendants. The defendants were in a better position
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to know the intent and purpose of their conduct,
which it might be difficult for the plaintiff to prove.
The Legislature merely enacted into law what is
common human experience, but when a person
causes injury by his acts, he should be deemed to
intend such consequences unless he can excuse or
explain his conduct by facts showing he had an innocent intent. It was so enacted to avoid the possible conclusion that the accuser, from whom the
defendant's purpose is generally concealed, must
produce affirmative evidence of guilty intent in
every situation in order to make out a prima facie
case of a violation of the act. After proof of a sales
below cost and injury resulting therefrom, there is
no undue hardships cast upon the defendants to require them to come forward with evidence of their
true intent as against the prima facie showing, or
with evidence which will hring them in the specified
exemptions in the act. The power to enact such a
provision in appropriate cases has been upheld in
this state.

The Wisconsin statute states that sales at less
than cost "shall be prima facie evidence of intent to
induce the purchase of other merchandise, or to
unfairly divert trade from a competitor, or to otherwise injure a competitor." In a most recent case,
State v. Eau Claire Oil Co.. 151 N.W.Zd 634 0Nisc.
1967). the court held:
We hold there is a rational connection between the
facts presumed in the last sentence of sub. (4) of
sec. 100.30, Stats., viz., "intent to induce the purchase of other merchandise, or to unfairly divert
trade from a competitor, or to otherwise injure a
competitor" and the evidence of the selling by de-
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fendant of the mixed nuts, toilet tissue, and work
gloves below cost. Therefore, it necessarily follows
that the statutory presumption is constitutional as
so applied.

See Rocky Mountain Wholesale Co. v. Ponka
Wholesale Mercantile Co., supra: Mering v. Yolo
Grocery and Meat Market. 127 P.2d 985 (Calif. 1942),
and Mcintyre v. Borossky. supra.
Our own statute requires a sale below cost plus
a limitation on the quantity to be sold per customer.
Thus, creating a much closer relationship between
the fact presumed and the fact proven.
A merchants sole purpose for being in business
is to qet customers to his store and sell him merchandise at a profit. If he ceases doing this, he will
soon be out of business.
He is not going to sell merchandise, such as a
camera, at a loss just to make as many of his customers as possible happy, as is contended by the defendants. He obviously anticipates an economic gain
from such an action. The gain of an economic ad
vantage by loss selling is just what the legislature
has declared to be an unfair business practice which
impairs arid prevents fair competition and thus injures the public we1fare.
If there is any intent but to achieve an economic
gain, why would Skaggs be so concerned about
competitors purchasing the loss-leader items? (T. 39)
In fact, this is the whole purpose of this provision
which is to qive the marchants a self-policing tool
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whereby they can take the edge off the economic
advantages of loss-leader selling by purchasing
large quantities of loss-items sold.
POINT II
WITH RESPECT TO (';RAND CENTRAL'S SALE OF
AQUA NET HAIR SPRAY AT FORTY NINE CENTS
AND SKAGG'S SALE OF STYLE HAIR SPRAY AT
FORTY NINE CENTS ON JUNE 23rd, 1966, THE
COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THEY WERE EACH
"MADE BY THEM IN AN ENDEAVOR TN GOOD FAITH
TO MEET THE PRICES OF THEIR COMPETITOR,
SHOPPERS DISCOUNT, AND IN HOLDING THAT
THEY WERE ENTITLED TO ASSUME THAT THE ADVERTISED PRICE OF SHOPPERS DISCOUNT FOR
AQUA NET HAIR SPRAY WAS A LEGAL PRICE IN THE
ABSENCE OF ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF AN ILLEGAL
SALE BY SHOPPERS DISCOUNT IN VIOLATION OF
THE ACT. (R. 46(a).)

It is clear from the testimony given that there
w0s absolutely no effort by Skaggs or Grand Central
to determine whether or not the prices of their comp2titors were legal or not. (T. 3, 11, 24, 29, 43) No
effcrl was made to contact the Trade Commission
or ;;my suppliers to see if the low prices of the com1-1.::trtors were below cost or not. Some effort would
be necessary in order to claim good faith. This is
especially true when they are both big users of the
Product and knew it was below their own cost as
determined by the Act.
The answer given for selling below cost was
that it was an answer to a competitive situation that
couldn't be left unanswered. (T. '.i) The law has pro-
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vided a legal means to answer any illegal economL:
challenge such as this with triple damages awarded
the injured party. Utah Code Ann. § 13-5-14 (1962).
It is submitted that such challenges be resolved
by law rather than in the open competitive markei
place where an innocent small merchant gets ir.jured. See Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Oklahoma Retail
Grocers Ass'n (Okla. 1957), 322 P.2d 179, 70 A.L.R.2d
1068 and affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court, supra.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SALE
BY SKAGGS OF CIGARETTES AND THE GIFT OF A
CIGARETTE LIGHTER WITH A CARTON OF CIGARETTES DID NOT VIOLATE THE ACT BECAUSE THE
SALE OF THE CIGARETTES ALONE WAS NOT A SALE
BELOW COST AS DEFINED IN THE ACT AND THE
GIFT OF THE CIGARETTE LIGHTER WAS A GIFT,
NOT A SALE, AND NOT PROHIBITED BY SECTION
13-5-9 OF THE ACT. (R. 46, b)

Utah Code Ann. s 13-5-9(1) (Supp. 1965) has been
interpreted to read that when the seller sells an
item and in con.junction therewith, gives an ltem
away, the cost to the seller of the item given away is
not to be computed in considering whether the
seller has·violated the act. Utah Code Ann. § 13-5-9(1)
(Supp. 1965) provides:
For the purpose of preventing evasion of this act in
all sales involving more than one item or commodity the vender's or distributor's selling price shall
not be below the cost of all articles, products and
commodities included in such transactions. Each
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article, product or commodity individually advertised or offered for sale, shall be individually subject to the requirements of § 13-5-7, when sold with
other articles, products, or commodities.

When a merchant offers a carton of cigarettes at
a specified price and offers to give away a lighter
with the purchase, it is only reasonable to assume
that the sale involved both the carton of cigarettes
and the lighter and that the cost of both items must
be taken into account. The terms "all sales involving more than one item", "when sold with other
articles", and "shall be individually subject to" of
the above statute makes this clear.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO INTRODUCE SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE THAT THE INTENT OF SKAGGS AND/OR
GRAND CENTRAL IN MAKING THE SALE OF ASPIRINS, SWINGER CAMERA, LEE'S MEN'S PANTS, AND
TURKEYS, WAS TO INDUCE THE PURCHASE OF
OTHER MERCHANDISE OR TO UNLAWFULLY DIVERT TRADE FROM A COMPETITOR OR TO OTHERWISE INJURE A COMPETITOR (R. 46, 47, 48)

All of the above prices are below cost. Skaggs
and Grand Central are profit making businesses and
iI they sold all their items below cost they would
soon be out of business. Making a profit on invest··
ment is their reason for existing. A sale below cost
1vuuld be contrary to their interest unless they anticipated an over-all economic gain from such an

26
action. The economic gain of course is to bring cus
tomers into the store. (T. 5, 45, 46, 55)
The principal purpose for getting customers
into the store by the use of low prices is to get them
to purchase other merchandise. (T. 46)
The court in North Carolina Milk Commission v.
National Food Stores, Inc., 154 S.E.2d 548 (N.C. 1967,1
commenting on this point stated:
The very purpose and nature of competition involves the intent to attract to one's self customers
who might otherwise trade with a rival producer or
seller.

In some cases the stores may have other reasons
dlong with the reason to induce the purchase of
other merchandise such as a desire to reduce inventory in items like Lee's Men's Pants or when
they fail to purchase sufficient items, such as :
turkeys, at one price and must repurchase at a high
er price for the same advertised sale. Although al
times it may be difficult to determine the prevaliing intent, the intent to induce the purchase of othe:
merchandise is always there and when this is done
with below cost selling the evil the legislature
wished to prevent is present.
Even though it may be difficult to determine
the prevailing intent, it is submitted that whenever
a store induces a customer to purchase an item sel:.
ing below cost it has taken that particular sale awa·
from another store ,=md has 11nfairly diverted trade

,rom a compemor by selling De1ow cost. (T. 45, 46J
The competitor has also been injured in that he did
not qet that particular sale or at least he did not have
·• J iir n0p=.!rt1 mity to compete for it.
The court in Laundry Operating Co. v. Spauld:ng L::~undry and Dry Cleaning Co., supra, stated:
. . . opinion is that to the extent a competitor is
caused to lose business, competition is destroyed.
It would hardly be in keeping with common sense to
hold that activities otherwise falling within the interdict of the statute would be proper so long as
the intent of the guilty party is something short of
a design to effect the complete destruction of competition ....

CONCLUSION
TlY' Leg1sla.ture, with the proper authority, has
that the selling of merchandise below
cost is dangerous to the public welfare and has
passed a law to prevent it, with a few exceptions.
The courts of other jurisdictions have held statutes
s1mila.r to the statute here in question to be consti-lutionally valid as an attempt to prevent the evils 0£
'~elling merchandise below cost and eventually de~ttny1ng competition.

ijeter rnined

Also, lhe evidence was such that the lower
'.c11rt should have held the intent in making a sale
cnst w:Js to induce the purchase of other mer1,_L~) Ci of unfairly diverting trade from a com.. :i '·'r u otherwise injuring a competitor.
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It is respectfully submitted that the fmdmgs and
judgment of the lower court be reversed in its entirety.
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